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Abstract
In this paper, I study industry-university relations in a principal-
agent framework. Following the existing literature, these re-
lations are interpreted in two ways: (1) as occurring through
spillovers of knowledge among diﬀerent groups of researchers,
working for diﬀerent institutional settings; or (2) as more formal
interactions, through the possibility, for a scientist, to directly re-
spond to incentives deﬁned by the diﬀerent communities she may
belong to. I formalize these two conﬁgurations in a uniﬁed frame-
work. I account for: (1) the inherent diﬃc u l t yi nm e a s u r i n gt h e
impact of scientiﬁc activities; and (2) the multiplicity of activi-
ties that scientists perform. I combine multi-task agency models
with distorted performance measures and common agency mod-
els. My model identiﬁes several types of incongruities between
an agent’s actions and the desired outcomes. These incongruities
derive also from the strategic interaction among the principals. I
also identify some potentially distortionary behavioral eﬀects of
t h ep r e s e n c eo fs p i l l o v e r s .
Keywords: Economics of Science; Agency Theory; Industry-
University Relations; Science Policy; R&D Management.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
T h em o d e r nl i t e r a t u r eo nt h eE c o n o m i c so fS c i e n c eh a sm a d ei m p o r t a n t
progress in the last 30 years. The original insights on the public nature
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1of knowledge, by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), have represented the
basis of these developments. Two broad streams of research can be
identiﬁed as having extended those pathbreaking works.
Some scholars have stressed the complexity and uncertainty of the
production of scientiﬁc knowledge and of its transmission and absorp-
tion. Knowledge is assumed to be dispersed among heterogeneous ac-
tors, and communication is not immediate. The ’linear model’ [basic
research—>applied research (—>development)] is rejected. Uncertainty,
serendipity, feedback from users, heterogeneous capabilities, etc. are
taken as important (Von Hippel (1988), Rosenberg (1990, 1994), Nelson
(1990, 2003), Nightingale (2000), Salter and Martin (2001)). Diﬀerent
capabilities and diﬀerent institutional actors produce beneﬁcial diversity
and potential spillovers of knowledge.
A second stream of research, called the ’New Economics of Science’
(NES hereafter), interprets Science as, ﬁrst of all, an institution. This
institution has peculiar rules and a reward system, priority-based, that
stimulates openness and disclosure. Other institutions, driven by dif-
ferent objectives, also perform research. The decision to perform diﬀer-
ent types of research is endogenous and depends on the incentive sys-
tems. This approach draws from sociological analyses of Science (Merton
(1957), Glaser (1964), Blume (1974), Long and McGinnis (1981)). The
NES also draws from modern economic theory, especially the Economics
of information, contracts and organizations.
These two views, taken together, depict scientiﬁca n di n n o v a t i v ea c -
tivities as complex processes, resulting from the presence of several types
of actors (ﬁrms, universities, etc.), their coordination, and the presence
of institutional incentives that guide the actions of individuals, groups
and organizations. They have oﬀered important contributions to deal-
ing with issues of science policy as well as of the organization of research
activities in business ﬁrms.
An issue of recent interest has concerned the interaction between
academia and the business sector. Traditionally, industry-university re-
lations have been seen as occurring through informal channels, such as
knowledge spillovers. More recently, much attention has been devoted to
more formal and explicit forms of relations. The perception of a decline
in US competitiveness in the 1980s has induced a series of reforms meant
to increase the contribution of universities and public research centers to
the growth of the economy. Legislative interventions, like the 1980 Bayh-
Dole Act, have de facto promoted much stronger university-industry re-
lations. Policy makers in Europe have looked at these developments with
great interest .
The scholarly debate has been intense. For approaches that have
2deepened the analysis of the nature of knowledge, an excessive degree
of industry-university relationships may present a dilemma. On the one
hand, the transmission of knowledge is made easier, since spillovers be-
tween diﬀerent organizations will be imperfect in the absence of direct
interaction. On the other hand, some beneﬁts from diversity may get
lost if relationships are too strong. However, these points raise some
questions. For example, it is not clear why interaction should automat-
ically reduce diversity. Also, the eﬀects of the presence of spillovers on
incentives to perform research are not frequently explored. The insti-
tutional spirit of the New Economics of Science may oﬀer insights. For
example, an issue of analysis in the NES is the ability of universities to
continue promoting basic research, if they are allowed to interact (either
compete or cooperate) with the business sector through patenting and
licensing activities. Similarly, concerns are raised on the ability of busi-
ness ﬁrms to commit to long-term, uncertain basic research, because of
conﬂicting objectives. Despite the roots in the Economics of Contracts,
few formal models of these issues are available. Much of the literature
on industry-university relations has, indeed, developed at an informal or
empirical level.
In this paper, I oﬀer an agency-theoretic perspective on the relation-
ships between diﬀerent institutions in the performance of research. I
employ some of the theoretical tools developed since the late 1980s (see
Gibbons (2003) for a review). The multidimensionality of the eﬀort of
a scientist (the agent), and the diﬃculty to reward scientiﬁc activities,
are seen as deﬁning a multi-task principal-agent problem with distorted
performance measures (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Baker (2003),
Datar et al. (2001), Feltham and Xie (1994)). I analyze, in this frame-
work, the role of knowledge spillovers among diﬀerent research agents,
working for diﬀerent organizations (principals). I show that even these
informal interactions may have some important eﬀects on incentives,
strategic behavior and the informativeness of the performance measures.
These implications have been rarely considered to date. I interpret more
direct forms of interactions, like formal university-industry relationships,
as the possibility, for a scientist, to have multiple aﬃliations or to di-
rectly respond to diﬀerent types of institutional rules: a case of com-
mon agency (Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Dixit (1997), Dixit et al.
(1997), Mezzetti (1997)). In this case, I show that the main trade oﬀ
is between the reduction of duplication of eﬀort, and the excessive free-
riding behavior on the part of the principals.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide a brief
summary of the insights of institutional approaches to Science that I see
as particularly relevant for my study. I also review some of the exist-
3ing literature on industry-university relations. In Section 3, I propose
an agency-theoretic model of industry-university relations. A discussion
and some numerical examples are also presented. Section 4 oﬀers con-
cluding remarks. Bibliographic references are in Section 5. Tables and
ﬁgures are in Section 6. An appendix is provided in Section 7.
2 The institutional analysis of Science
2.1 Dasgupta and David (1994)
’Both the corporate scientists and their academic rivals are obsessed with
winning, and they continually fret that the competition will publish a critical
ﬁnding ﬁrst’ (D. Stipp, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 1994)
’In addition to ribbon, the tangible rewards for doing science include gold.’
(Stephan and Levin 1992, p. 20).
I now present in a few points the main features of the institutional
approach to the economic analysis of scientiﬁc research proposed by
Dasgupta and David (1994, DD hereafter). This paper oﬀers a rather
comprehensive view of the New Economics of Science. Recalling the
main points of this article will help to understand the development of
my analysis.
1. If we focus our attention on the social arrangements that guide
scientiﬁc activity, we encounter two major institutional models. One of
them, called the ’Republic of Science’ (Polanyi (1962)), has the maximal
diﬀusion of knowledge as key objective. Its basic rules are the principle of
priority in discovery as reward system, the disclosure of discoveries, and
free access to them, typically through scientiﬁc publication or sharing of
data, instrumentation, etc.1 Universities and publicly funded research
organizations are the natural, though not exclusive, places for such in-
stitutional form. The other institutional model is called the ’Realm of
Technology’, and the major objective is to obtain economic rents from
scientiﬁc research. Privacy and non-disclosure will prevail in this en-
vironment. Industrial R&D is the typical locus for this organizational
mode. The Republic of Science and the Realm of Technology are there-
fore meant for diﬀerent, complementary functions, and both are poten-
tially valuable for society.
2. The key distinction between open science and industrial R&D is
therefore not in terms of the activities that are performed, e.g. ’science
1Another key feature of the Republic of Science is the evaluation based on peer
review. David (1998) identiﬁes two factors that explain the origin of this ’open sci-
ence’ system: (1) the Scientiﬁc Revolution; and (2) and the compensating mechanism
deﬁned by aristocratic patronage. Both epistemological and institutional factors are
therefore highlighted.
4vs. technology’ or ’applied vs. basic research’. The choice of performing
basic vs. applied research is endogenous, and depends on the incentive
systems set up by the diﬀerent organizational forms.
3. Evaluating scientiﬁc activity and the quality of discoveries is ex-
tremely diﬃcult due to the multifaceted nature of the activities and the
complexity of the knowledge base. The deﬁnition of incentives and the
allocation of resources, therefore, take into account both the diﬀerent ob-
jectives and the diﬃculties arising from such information asymmetries.
In the Republic of Science, for example, the priority-based system is
the response to the necessity of deﬁning incentive schemes on observable
performance, and to the diﬃculty of awarding prizes based on ranks2.
This reward system also enhances public disclosure and stimulates new
ﬁndings. These devices can be therefore seen as second-best choices.
What is strongly stressed, in the light of the previous points, is the
necessity of maintaining both institutional settings and of keeping them
relatively separated and diﬀerentiated. We can see this analysis as a
concerned response to some perceived changes in the orientation of sci-
ence policies in major Western countries (especially the US) since the
1980s.
While there is a strong claim in favor of institutional diversity as
expressed by institutions having diﬀerent objectives, the authors do
not fully explore how interactions translate into incentive systems, even
maintaining diﬀerent institutional goals.
2.2 The related literature on industry-university re-
lations
Several studies have recently focused on the process toward a ’privatiza-
tion’ of academic activities, for example the possibility for universities to
license also discoveries emerging from publicly funded projects (as from
the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act and further reforms in 1984) or the possibility
of sharing the revenues of licenses between the university and the single
inventor. The debate has mainly concerned the risk of excessive similar-
ities between the institutional goals and the incentive systems of closed
and open science, because of distortionary eﬀects on behavior. However,
potential complementarities between diﬀerent kinds of activities have
2This reward system also enhances public disclosure and stimulates new ﬁndings.
These devices can be therefore seen as second-best choices. Moreover, they generate
some congruity between the interests of the scientiﬁc community and the societal
interest more in general. For, from the point of view of the society, the value of
’arriving second’, i.e. of discovering something that has already been discovered,
is zero. Finally, the authors also discuss several potential distortions deriving from
these systems. I will not refer to them here.
5also been considered 3.
The majority of the studies, however, have taken the economic-
theoretical issues of DD as a ’background’, and have proposed verbal
arguments and empirical evidence consistent with them. This might
limit our ability to analyze the behavioral eﬀects of diﬀerent forms and
degrees of interaction among diﬀerent institutions.
Some very recent works have taken a step forward to formal analysis4.
Lach and Schankermann (2003) make an explicit reference to organiza-
tional and contract theoretic tools. They deﬁne a multi-task setting to
analyze how monetary incentives aﬀect the choice of academic scien-
tists to license their discoveries. However, the preferences of scientists
for performing diﬀerent activities are somewhat taken as given and not
endogenized as response to diﬀerent kinds of incentives. Jensen et al.
(2003) model the process of faculty disclosure and university licensing
through a Technology Transfer Oﬃce as an agency problem, where both
the faculty and the TTOs are agents of the same principal, the Univer-
sity. Diﬀerently from the framework I will propose, the authors do not
explicitly consider the multidimensionality of eﬀort. Also, the multiplic-
ity of aﬃliations is not analyzed directly.
Other two works are noteworthy in the study of the relations be-
tween diﬀerent institutions in research activities. Stern (1999) models
the choice of the ﬁrst-long term job position of research scientists. He
tests his model on a sample of biology post-docs, and ﬁnds that re-
searchers are willing to accept a lower monetary compensation from their
(proﬁt oriented) employers if they are allowed to keep relations with the
external scientiﬁc community. However, the interaction with the sci-
entiﬁc community and its incentive system are taken as given and not
modeled, or only partially endogenized. Cockburn et al. (1999) build
a model of research activities based on the multi-task agency theory of
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994). They ﬁnd that, in drug com-
panies, incentive provisions to perform basic and applied research are
complementary. Incentive for basic research are expressed as rewards
3See, among others, Lee (1996), Henderson et al. (1998), Powell and Owen-Smith
(1998), Stephan et al.(2002), Nelson (2003), Goldfarb et al. (2003), Sampat et al.
(2003), Ranga et al. (2003). The ﬁnding of Levin and Stephan (1991) on the presence
of a ’life cycle’ in the productivity of scientists, with a decline over time, is interpreted
by the authors also as a warning about the progressive ’ageing’ of university scientists.
This ageing may be caused by the increasing similarity of academia with the business
environment, and the comparative advantage of the latter in providing monetary
incentives and to look more attractive to young talented scientists.
4I am referring, here, to contractual and organizational analyses. Formal mod-
eling of related phenomena, for example on the creation of social networks, is also
developing. See for example Cowan and Jonard (1999).
6for a good standing in the scientiﬁc community. A limit, in this case,
is that the interaction between diﬀerent institutional settings is missing,
since only one objective is expressed, i.e. economic proﬁt maximiza-
tion. Moreover, the major distinction seems to be in terms of types of
activities and not in terms of diﬀerent institutional goals.
In o wt u r nt om ym o d e l .
3A m o d e l
If o c u so nt h ee ﬀects of diﬀerent forms of interaction between diﬀerent
institutional settings. I take the coexistence of diﬀerent objectives by
diﬀerent communities as granted, and analyze the impact on the incen-
t i v e sf o rt h ea g e n t s .
Here is a summary of the aspects I want to model:
- Scientiﬁc activities are performed in institutional settings having
diﬀerent objectives. Scientiﬁce ﬀort is multidimensional.
- The evaluation of scientiﬁce ﬀort in inherently problematic. First,
the results are highly uncertain, and so is their value. Second, observing
and evaluating what scientists really do is diﬃcult and costly.
- The activity of a scientist may also inﬂuence the activity and the
performance of other scientists, working for the same organization or for
others, through knowledge spillovers.
The joint considerations of all these phenomena is novel in the eco-
nomic analysis of research activities. A principal-agent perspective oﬀers
a potentially valuable framework for such a combination. The constructs
I see as relevant are:
- Multi-task environment, multi-dimensional eﬀort choice, distorted
performance measures. Each of the objectives (and performance mea-
sures) I refer to is potentially aﬀe c t e db ym o r et h a no n ek i n do fe ﬀort;
the output is not veriﬁable (by a third party), while there are veriﬁable
performance measures available; the marginal eﬀects of the agent’s eﬀort
on the contractible measure may not be perfectly aligned to the eﬀect
on the ’true’ objective measure5.
- Common agency: the formal interaction between the two commu-
nities can be seen, in agency theoretic terms, as a case in which several
principals try to aﬀect the behavior of the same agent (see Bernheim
and Whinston (1986), Mezzetti (1997)); conversely, we may have diﬀer-
ent agents responding to diﬀerent principals.
Ic o n s i d e rt w oc o n ﬁgurations: (i) the presence of two separate com-
munities of scientists working for separate organizations with diﬀerent
5This conﬁguration diﬀers from the Holmstrom-Milgrom treatment and is more
akin to Feltham and Xie (1994), Datar et al. (2001), and Baker (2003).
7goals, say ’Science’ and ’Business’; (ii) a unique community of scientists
aﬃliated with, and responding to both organizations6. The commer-
cial use of university research ’simply’ through knowledge spillovers will
(loosely) correspond to case (i). More formal and explicit forms of in-
teraction between business and academia can be seen, at their extreme,
as represented by case (ii).
3.1 The general environment
Assume that there are two principals, say the scientiﬁcc o m m u n i t ya n da
business ﬁrm. Each community has an objective, and needs the services
of an agent to pursue this goal. The two principals may each have one
separated agent (or team, see footnote 6). Alternatively, the same agent
can work for both communities. This latter conﬁguration is called ’com-
mon agency’ or ’interaction’. I call the former case ’exclusive dealing’ or
’separation’.
The objective of the scientiﬁc community (or institution A) is the










2 + εK (1)
where eA
1 and eA
2 represent the eﬀort levels of the agent working for A
(agent A), in two distinct activities; we can call them applied (eA
1 )a n d
basic (eA
2 ) research. k1 and k2 are parameters representing marginal
productivities. In addition, when two agents (or teams) are present, and
work for each of the two diﬀerent institutions, they inﬂuence also the
outcome of interest of the institution for whom they do not formally
work. This is captured, in expression (1), by β1eB
1 + β2eB
2 ,a n dIc a l l
this a spillover of knowledge. εK is an error term indicating stochastic
shocks, as well as the unmodeled inﬂuence of other factors. The expected
value of εK, as well as that of all the other error terms that follow, is
normalized to zero.
The business sector (institution B) is interested in the production of









2 + εP (2)
where the explanation of the terms is just as for expression (1). We
assume therefore that both kinds of activities may inﬂuence the produc-
tion of knowledge and the generation of economic proﬁts. In addition,
6I do not consider, here, the problems emerging from teamwork, like free riding
etc. When I talk about a group of agents, I consider them as a unique decision maker.
8we consider the role of spillovers, when diﬀerent teams work for diﬀerent
institutions.
If only one team is present and works for both communities, then the
spillover terms will not be present. The unique agent aﬀects simultane-
ously both objectives. Expressions 1 and 2 reduce to:
K = k1e1 + k2e2 + εK (3)
P = p1e1 + p2e2 + εP (4)
It is not possible, however, to provide incentives based on outcomes
K and P: they are too complex to be veriﬁed by a third party (see Baker
(1992, 2003)). Two contractible performance measures are available:



















2 + εy (6)
for patents.
Similarly to what said just above, these expression reduce, in the
case of common agency, to:
X = φ1e1 + φ2e2 + εx (7)
Y = γ1e1 + γ2e2 + εy (8)
The marginal impacts, as well as the unexplained components in the
error terms, are allowed to diﬀer from those of the ’true’ objectives.
For example, a researcher’s eﬀort may be very strongly aﬀecting the
generation of patentable innovations, but these innovations may be not
so valuable in terms of overall proﬁts for the ﬁrm7.
Both performance measures are potentially relevant with respect to
both objectives. They may add information to reward unobservable
eﬀort and to ﬁlter out some uncertainty. In what follows, I assume risk
neutral agents so the issue of risk-ﬁltering is not relevant. Regarding the
addition of information, I restrict to cases where publications are the
7See, among others, Agrawal and Henderson (2002) for some considerations about
the imperfect role of published and patented research in predicting the value of the
produced knowledge and also of the knowledge used in the business sector. See also
Griliches (1990).
9only ’natural’ performance measure for the production of knowledge in
the academia, and the same holds for patents with respect to proﬁts in
the ’Realm of Technology’8. I am therefore considering a conﬁguration
where only one performance measure is available to each principal. I am
aware that this is a limitation, but I believe that the model still gives
some interesting insights9.
Finally, notice that the spillovers on the performance measures may
diﬀer from those on the objective functions. In addition, the spillovers
on the performance measures do not have any direct impact on welfare.
As we will see shortly, they will have an informational and strategic role,
which existing analyses (both formal and informal) have not considered
explicitly.











As for the wage schedule, I adopt a linear incentive scheme. I also
exclude the presence of a ﬁxed salary. Linear wage schemes produce
fairly tractable models. The absence of a ﬁxed salary serves to produce
uniqueness of the solutions in the common agency case. This will be
clear later10. The outside option is equal to zero for all parties.
3.1.1 The timing and the equilibrium concepts
The timing of the game is represented in ﬁgure 1. In the ﬁrst stage (t=1),
the principals simultaneously set their optimal piece rate. In the second
8Several studies have used publications as a proxy of knowledge production in
academe and patents as a measure of research and innovative activities in ﬁrms. For
a recent example, see Agrawal and Cockburn (2003).
9A situation I am apparently excluding is the patenting activity by universities.
However, the common agency case can be interpreted as implying the decision by
open science organizations to allow scientists participating to the work of the business
sector and to give them all the royalties from such activities. I am also excluding
’philanthropic ﬁnalities’ of business ﬁrms, which may set up private foundations that
pursue the generation of new knowledge as an end in itself. However, we can think
of these foundations as separate entities with respect to the ’parent’ company, and
therefore as an additional principal with a diﬀerent set of objectives (I am therefore
not assuming that the company, by setting a separate foundation, jointly maximizes
the economic rents and the production of scientiﬁc knowledge). In a partially diﬀerent
perspective, my choice can be interpreted as an assumption of the inability of a given
organization to commit to certain ultimate objectives, diﬀerent from their ’natural’
ones. See, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2003).
10See the Appendix. The choice of linear incentives schemes by the principals in
such a setting, diﬀerent from the one depicted in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987),
may not necessarily be optimal. Indeed I do not make any claim in this sense.
10stage (t=2), the agent(s) chooses (choose) her level of eﬀort, given the
choice of the piece rates. The appropriate concept of equilibrium to be
applied, here, is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. I therefore solve
the game by backward induction. In t=1 a simultaneous game, among
principals, is taking place.
3.2 Exclusive dealing







A is the piece rate and X is deﬁned in expression (5). The
risk neutral agent maximizes her expected payoﬀ E(WA−C) with respect
to eA
1 and eA






















These choices deﬁne the Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints
that the principals consider. Principal A solves:
Maxα
sep
A {E(ΠA)=E(K − α
sep




B {E(ΠB)=E(P − α
sep
B Y )} subject to: (11) to (14) (16)
Plug (1), (5) and (11) to (14) into (15); and (2), (6), and (11) to (14)
into (16). Determine the (necessary and suﬃcient) ﬁrst-order conditions
of (15) with respect to α
sep
A , and of (16) with respect to α
sep
























11I am implicitly assuming that any kind of income is in monetary terms or can
be translated in monetary terms.





(norm of k or Euclidean distance from the origin) and the same notation
is used for all the other two-dimensional vectors of coeﬃcients.





|γ|(2|k||φ|cosθkφ − |δ||p|cosθδγ cosθpγ)







|γ|(4|φ||γ| − |δ||η|cosθδγ cosθηφ)
(20)
θij is the angle between the vectors i and j. I use the equality:
ij = |i||j|cosθij
12.
Assume the Participation Constraints are met (as I do in all that
follows), so the constrained solutions coincide with the ’partially uncon-
strained’ ones.
3.2.1 Discussion
I provide some comparative statics for the results. I analyze the eﬀect
of changes in the parameters on α
sep
A . It is straightforward to accommo-
date my considerations for α
sep
B . Moreover, I assume that all marginal
products are non-negative, that the cosines have values between 0 and











> 0. The impact of |k| represents a scaling
eﬀect. The higher the norm of the marginal impact of agent A’s eﬀort
on principal A’s objective, the more proﬁtable it is, for the principal,
to provide high-powered incentives. cosθkφ is a synthetic measure of
the ’alignment’ between the impact of scientist A on the objective and
on the performance measure. The higher the alignment, the stronger
the provided incentives. The incentive rate does not depend on the
correlation among the objective and performance measures. For, this
correlation is also aﬀected by the covariance between the error terms,
which the agent does not control. More precisely, the incentive rate
depends on the collinearity between the marginal products of eﬀorts.
These results are similar to those in Baker (2003) and are intuitive.
12See Baker (2003) for the use of similar geometric notation.
13In strict sense, performing comparative statics requires that we keep all but
one parameter constant. In this formulation, for example, this implies that, when
we consider the change in the norm of a vector, we should move it in such a way
that the alignments between that vector and the others with whom it interact are
unchanged. This can be obtained by multplying both components of the vector by
a positive constant. When, instead, we mo v eo n eo ft h ec o s i n e s ,w es h o u l dk e e pt h e






>< 0. unlike the Baker’s (2003) model, where an increase in
the impact of eﬀort on the performance measure, ceteris paribus, always
aﬀects the piece rate negatively, here the result is more complex. On
the one hand, an increase in |φ| has a negative eﬀect on the optimal
piece rate, because the relative productivity of the agent’s eﬀort on the
objective, with respect to the performance measure, is smaller. On the
other hand, this will impact also the welfare of principal B through
the presence of spillovers. Principal B is induced to supplement A in
the provision of incentives. However, he can also exploit his strategic
inﬂuence on A, and can increase α
sep
B ’not too much’ in order to push
principal A to decrease α
sep
A ’not too much’. Principal A therefore faces
an incentive to move α
sep
A in the opposite direction than the one described
above. The overall impact is ambiguous. We see, here, a ﬁrst strategic











< 0. These are pure free-riding eﬀects. For
example, if |p| increases, institution B will unambiguously increase his
piece rate. Scientist B will supply higher eﬀort, and this, if spillovers
are present, will also beneﬁt institution A. Therefore, institution A will
ﬁnd it optimal to get a free ride on B and reduce his costs by providing











> 0. |δ| has an ambiguous impact, while the
impact of |η| is unambiguously positive. We can interpret these results as
follows. First, an increase in |δ| has a negative ’information eﬀect’. If |δ|,
a measure of the contribution of agent B to the performance measure
X of principal A, is high, then the contribution of agent A to X (on
which she is paid) is relatively smaller. Therefore, there is an incentive,
for principal A, to reduce the marginal reward for agent A. A strategic
eﬀect, among the two principals, is also present. The tendency to reduce
α
sep
A when |δ| increases, indeed, will induce principal B to respond with an
increase in α
sep
B . Therefore, the eﬀort provided by agent B will increase.
This makes, on the other hand, an increase in the incentive rate for agent
Al e s sc o s t l y ,s i n c ep r i n c i p a lAb e n e ﬁts also from the increased eﬀort of
agent B.
For the same reason why |δ| positively aﬀects α
sep
B ,s o|η| does with
respect to α
sep
A . Notice, also, that the impact of |δ| and |η| on α
sep
A is
asymmetric. If |η| =0 , |δ| still has an impact. More precisely, only
the negative, informational impact of |δ| will survive. When |δ| =0the
magnitude of |η| is irrelevant for the deﬁnition of the optimal α
sep
A .T h e
opposite holds for α
sep
B . This shows how important the informational
13impact of |δ| on α
sep
A i s ,i no r d e rt op u ti nm o t i o nt h es t r a t e g i ce ﬀect of
|δ| itself and |η|.
The presence of an informational and strategic role for the spillovers
on the performance measures is a novel ﬁnding in the principal-agent
literature. These spillovers tell the principal about the goodness of per-
formance measure in inferring the eﬀort of his own agent. They also
give information on how the other principal will behave. These ﬁnd-
ings also contribute to more qualitative studies, since the majority of
them have not appropriately explored how knowledge spillovers aﬀect
incentives and incentive provision.
The role of the cosines can be interpreted in similar fashions as those
of the eﬀects discussed above. They can also be seen as aﬀecting the
magnitude (and the direction) of the impact of the various norms of
vectors just described. Some alignment among the various marginal
productivities is necessary to make these productivities have some im-
pact.
To summarize:
1. The presence of spillovers is crucial in order to generate strategic
interaction among principals. Each principal is aﬀected also by the ac-
tion of the other agent, and therefore by the incentive scheme deﬁned


















There is no strategic interaction among the principals. Each piece
rate depends only on the parameters of ’its own principal’. Moreover,
the comparative statics are unambiguous for each of the terms in the
expressions. Notice also the diﬀe r e n tr o l eo ft h em a r g i n a li m p a c t so f
spillovers on the objectives and on the performance measures. While the
impact of agent j on the objective of principal i is easily interpretable as
something that directly aﬀects payoﬀs and social welfare, the ’spillovers’
on the performance measures may convey information in the deﬁnition
of the appropriate incentives. If spillovers are also present at the level
of performance measures, then the optimal incentives will be altered.
2. The fact that the incentives provided by principal j may aﬀect
also principal i will give rise to temptations to get a free ride on each
other’s incentive scheme.
143. More subtly, each institution cannot provide incentives to the
scientist aﬃliated to the other institution in a direct fashion: it can
inﬂuence her behavior only through the inﬂuence on the other institu-
tion’s choice of the optimal incentive scheme. This, as we will see, is
an interesting diﬀerence also from the common agency case, where each
institution can directly inﬂuence the same (unique) agent.
3.3 Common agency
Let us now assume that, instead of two diﬀerent and separated popu-
lations of scientists, a unique population is allowed to respond to both
kinds of incentives directly. I assume a case, so to use Bernheim and
Whinston’s (1986) parlance, of ’intrinsic common agency’: the agent
is bound to both communities (see also Mezzetti (1997)). She will ac-
cept both contracts or neither contract. Therefore, for each principal,
the participation constraint to account for is with respect to the agent
exiting both relations and earning her outside option.
Each principal proposes a contract very similar to the previous ones:
WA = αAX (23)
WB = αBY (24)
αA and αB a r et h ep i e c er a t e s . X and Y a r ea si ne x p r e s s i o n s( 7 )
and (8). The agent maximizes her expected payoﬀ: E(WA + WB − C)
with respect to e1 and e2. The IC constraints for the principals will be:
e1 = αAφ1 + αBγ1 (25)
e2 = αAφ2 + αBγ2 (26)
Each optimal choice of eﬀort is now an average of the piece rates,
weighted by the marginal eﬀects of that particular kind of eﬀort on
the performance measures. In addition to the distortion in the marginal
products, another source of misalignment between each principal and the
agent comes from the agent taking directly into account the incentives
deﬁned by the other principal14. This is consistent with the distinction
between ’the motives of the individual scientists and the motives of the
ﬁrms that employs them’ made by Rosenberg (1990, p.169; see also
14Since eﬀort choices come from an average of diﬀerent rewards, this may also
reduce the heterogeneity among individuals.
15Nelson (1962, p.573))15.S i n c e e ﬀort choices come from an average of
diﬀerent rewards, this may reduce the heterogeneity among individuals.
Principal A solves
MaxαA{E(ΠA)=E(K − αAX)} subject to (25) and (26) (27)
Principal B solves
MaxαB{E(ΠB)=E(P − αBY )} s u b j e c tt o( 2 5 )a n d( 2 6 ) ( 2 8 )
simultaneously. Substitute (3), (7), (25) and (26) into (27); and (4), (8),
(25) and (26) into (28). Determine the (necessary and suﬃcient) ﬁrst-
order conditions of (27) with respect to αA, and of (28) with respect to











The Nash equilibrium piece rates are:
αA =



















> 0.F o r |k| and cosθkφ we
have the same unambiguous eﬀects as we obtained for the exclusive
dealing case. Here, however, also the eﬀect of |φ| is unambiguous. Both
principals exert a direct inﬂuence on the same agent, and this eliminates
a gaming component of this parameter.
15The expected payoﬀ of the scientist may also be written as: E[WB −(C −WA)].
So, from the point of view of the ﬁrm (for example), the scientists has a reduction
in her cost of eﬀort, because of the reward from academia. This is similar to what
has been called ’taste for science’ (see Stern (1999)). Unlike the majority of existing








< 0. We have a free-riding eﬀect from an in-
crease in the norm of marginal impact of eﬀort on the other principal’s
objective measure. Principal A will rely on B strengthening incentives
for the scientist, and this will beneﬁtAs i n c et h ee ﬀort of the scientist
impact also his objective Equivalently, we can say that A lowers the
piece rates since B will get relatively more beneﬁts from the agent’s ef-
fort. Stephan (1996), commenting on the frequently noted ﬂat proﬁle of
academic salaries along the career of a university professor, argues that
a more complete account of this fact should consider the presence of out-
side activities, especially for senior faculty. Stephan and Everhart (1998)
oﬀer some evidence on these additional sources. The symmetric eﬀect of
|k| on αB is consistent with Stern’s (1999) ﬁnding of scientists willing
to accept lower compensation from business ﬁrms, if they are allowed to
interact with the Republic of Science16. The impact of an increase in |p|
depends on the alignment between p and γ. If the performance measure
used by principal B is ’useless’ (i.e. very poorly aligned with p), then
B will provide very low incentives for Y, and so principal A will not be
induced to signiﬁcantly reduce αA even if the marginal impact of eﬀort




>< 0. The optimal level of αA depends also on the
alignment between the vectors of marginal productivities of eﬀorts on
the two performance measures. This alignment has an ambiguous eﬀect.
On one hand, an increase in cosθφγ will reinforce, ceteris paribus, the
incentive to free ride: the impact of the two kinds of eﬀort on X is
collinear to the impact on Y, and an increase in the piece rate on Y will
induce a behavioral response (in term of balance between the two kinds
of eﬀort) similar to what A can get by setting his piece rate. However,
suppose that |p|,o rcosθpγ, are small. Now, principal B will try to mute
incentives. The behavioral response of the agent would be harmful to
principal A, and more so when φ and γ are collinear: if |k| and cosθkφ
are suﬃciently high, A will prefer to supplement B in the provision
of incentives. Moreover, notice that cosθφγ enters the expression of
αB i nt h es a m ef a s h i o n . I t se ﬀe c ti ss y m m e t r i co nt h et w op r i n c i p a l s ,
who will therefore reduce their piece rates by a smaller amount. The
alignment between the performance measures may serve, therefore, to
16An increase in |k| may also be seen as an increase in the ability of the scientist.
Such increase may raise the equilibrium proﬁts of the business ﬁrm, in common
agency, even when its optimal piece rate goes down (see the numeric case 1 as an
example of an increase in the proﬁts of institution A when |p| goes up). This is
consistent with Stern’s (1999) claim that ﬁrms will be more willing to let better
scientists interact with the scientiﬁcc o m m u n i t y .
17mitigate the tendency to free ride, in order to exploit the advantages
t h a tt h es a m ek i n do fe ﬀorts have on both objectives. Even in a non-
cooperative setting, the principals are somewhat internalizing part of
the externalities. If cosθφγ =0 ,t h e nαA = α
sep
A and αB = α
sep
B when
spillovers are absent. Some level of congruity between the performance
measures makes the common agency case interesting. The principals are
concerned with the behavioral response of the same agent to incentives
deﬁned by diﬀerent institutions, and look at how such response will
diﬀer, if provided by themselves or by the competing principal. In the
exclusive dealing case, instead, the principals provide ’direct’ incentives
to separate agents. Each principal is not interested in how the piece rate
that the other principal is providing to an agent will be similar to the
o n eh ew o u l dp r o v i d et h a tv e r ys a m ea g e n t .
3.4 A summary of the main diﬀerences between the
exclusive dealing and the common agency cases
In o ws u m m a r i z et h eﬁndings of my analysis, concerning the two diﬀer-
ent forms and degrees of interaction among diﬀerent institutions, in the
performance of research activities.
1. In the exclusive dealing case, the presence of spillovers of one
agent’s activity on the other principal’s performance measure are crucial
to have strategic interaction among principals, since each principal can-
not inﬂuence the agent aﬃliated to the other institution directly. If the
spillovers were only on the objective function, the optimal piece rates
would be deﬁned, by each principal, without any considerations of what
the other principal does. This is clearly an extreme case, but a useful one
to begin to understand the diﬀerence between interactions at the level
of the objectives (i.e., presence or not of a multiplicity of institutional
goal) and interactions at the level of the incentive system, especially
when incentives cannot be deﬁned directly on the basis of the objective
measures.
2. A low impact of spillovers produces, in the exclusive dealing case,
low interaction and, potentially, high duplication of eﬀort. This will not
happen in the common agency case since the same agent’s eﬀort directly
aﬀects both institutional objectives. On the other hand, the exclusive
dealing case will not suﬀer from some of the ’distortions’ deriving from
strategic interaction (like an excessive tendency to free ride), and may
produce a better balance in the performance of diﬀerent activities.
3. While, in the exclusive dealing setting, the inﬂuence that principal
i exerts on agent j is an indirect one (i.e., it occurs only through the
strategic interactions among principals), in common agency we see both
an indirect and a direct inﬂuence. Each principal directly aﬀects the
18unique team of agents; the presence of the direct impact makes the
indirect inﬂuence diﬀerent from the separation case. In ﬁgure 2, the
solid lines represent direct inﬂuences, while the dotted lines represent
indirect inﬂuences.
4. The informational role of spillovers, which we have discussed in
the exclusive dealing case, is a relatively novel ﬁnding. This role is lost
in common agency, because of the absence of a multiplicity of actors
aﬃliated to diﬀerent institution and responding to diﬀerent incentive
schemes.
5. In both institutional settings, the impact of changes in the para-
meters of the ’true’ objective yields unambiguous comparative statics.
By contrast, the eﬀect of the parameters in the performance measure is,
in some cases, more subtle to understand and, even when monotone, is
typically not linear. This is another way to see the diﬀerences between
interaction in objectives and incentives.
The presence of several parameters and of some non-linearities makes
it diﬃcult to assess in general terms the desirability, from a social point
of view, of one or the other setting. I therefore proceed with some
numerical examples.
3.5 Some numerical examples
I propose three numerical examples to explore how diﬀerent values of the
parameters, or diﬀerent environments, aﬀect the results. These exercises
are meant to be just evocative and to ’check’ the ability of my model to
identify the determinants of the desirability of the two settings described.
I report, for each of the conﬁgurations, the value of the parameters, and
graphs representing the levels of the piece rates, the payoﬀso ft h et w o
principals, and the total welfare (sum of the payoﬀso fa l lt h ea c t o r s ) 17.
1. In case 1, we have high alignment between the objective and
the related performance measure for principal A, and a smaller impact
of the two activities, in particular e2, on the objective of principal B,
the business sector. Spillover parameters are all positive and relatively
small. The marginal impact of basic research eﬀort on the B’s objective
(p2) is increasing. Such increase has an eﬀect on both the magnitude of
the marginal impacts and the alignment between objectives and perfor-
17As expected, all cases have a level of total surplus below the ﬁr s tb e s t( c o m i n g
from joint maximization of payoﬀs, and observability of eﬀort choices). For the way
I set up the model, we may have diﬀerent levels of ﬁrst-best in the case of one and
two agents. If spillovers were absent, then the one-agent ﬁrst-best will dominate. See
Mezzetti (1997) for a similar result (due, in his case, to complementarities of eﬀort
choices). If spillovers on the objectives are substantial, the order may change. In
any case, in the non-cooperative setting with asymmetric information I set up, the
second-best ordering can be diﬀerent from the ﬁrst-best ordering.
19mance measures. When p2 increases, the common agency case tends to
dominate. For a very small p2, the free riding incentive of principal B is
high in both conﬁgurations, and this yields a low piece rate αB,w h i c hi n
turn reduces the eﬀort provided. When p2 moves up, the optimal αB and
α
sep
B increase. The decrease in the αAs is limited. The no-duplication
eﬀect, however, tends to prevail with respect to the spillovers, which
are relatively small. This conﬁguration may represent a case in which,
initially, basic research activities do not have a substantial role in the
generation of proﬁts, while they are important in the academic regime
for the creation of knowledge. In these conditions, mixing the two worlds
by allowing scientists to respond directly to both sets of incentives may
reduce welfare, since they will ﬁnd it optimal to contain eﬀort in basic
research. Once the impact of e2 grows also in business activities, then
common agency, as deﬁned here, would reduce duplication of eﬀort. This
would be particularly important if the application of such research re-
quires the direct employment of a given scientist, and cannot be easily
transferred among diﬀerent researchers (Zucker et al. (1998)). This case
is captured by the small values of the spillover parameters.
We can think of a shift in the scientiﬁc and technological paradigm
in an industry that leads to an increase of the role of basic research in
the generation of economic rents without a reduction, in absolute value,
of the role of applied research. We can also think of the presence of
a handful of skilled scientists whose knowledge is diﬃcult to transfer.
Consider, as an example, the case of the pharmaceutical industry after
the emergence of biotechnology18. Or, at cross sectional level, think of
the diﬀerence between science-based industries and sectors where basic
science is less proﬁtable (see Pavitt (1984) and the distinction between
Modes I and II of knowledge production in Gibbons et al. (1994)).
2. In case 2, it is instead the impact of e2 on the patent performance
measure Y, i.e. γ2, that varies. Initially, the increase in γ2 produces also
an increase in the alignment between the patent performance measure
and the economic proﬁts, but then cosθpγ tends to decrease. Moreover,
cosθφγ, the measure of the alignment between the performance measures,
is increasing. These two facts produce a strong reduction in αB, while
the eﬀect on α
sep
B is non-monotone, witnessing the diﬀerent kinds of
consequences, from a change in |γ|,i nt h et w oc o n ﬁgurations. After
an initial decrease, the optimal αA goes up, and this allows to limit
the negative eﬀect of the lower powered incentives provided by principal
B. The impact on α
sep
A is very limited, because of eﬀects moving in
diﬀerent directions. Total welfare in common agency is higher than in
18Powell and Owen-Smith (1998), Zucker et al. (1998), Henderson et al. (1999),
Cockburn and Henderson (2000), Cohen et al. (2002),
20the exclusive dealing case for small values of |γ|, and lower otherwise.
The strategic distortion concentrated on only one agent ends up being
deleterious for higher levels of |γ|. This example is interesting in that
we can see clearly how, in the two settings, optimal incentive provision
responds diﬀerently to a given change.
3. In case 3, I make |η| increase. Recall that η =( η1,η2) represents
the marginal impacts of the eﬀort of agent A on the performance mea-
sure used for rewarding agent B. It is a form of spillover, but not on
the ’true’ objective. As I discussed above, this may have more complex
and ambiguous eﬀects, because of the informational as well as strategic
impact of such change. In this particular case, an increase in spillovers
reduces the welfare in the exclusive dealing case, because strategic and
informational distortions prevail on the direct beneﬁcial eﬀect. This case
pushes us to be clearer on what is meant by spillover, in a setting when
imperfect performance measures are employed to reward agents. The
common agency case may be preferable not only when there is little
spillover at the level of the objective measures, if agents work sepa-
rately. The common agency case may prevail also because the strategic
distortions among principals, in exclusive dealing, can be even greater.
Moreover, strategic distortions in exclusive dealing may originate from
some parameters that, instead, do not aﬀect the common agency setting.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I have proposed a formalization of some recent insights
in the economic study of scientiﬁca c t i v i t i e s .T h ef o c a lt h e m eh a sb e e n
the desirability of interactions between not-for-proﬁt organizations and
business-oriented institutions, in the performance of scientiﬁc activities.
These interactions have been viewed traditionally in terms of ’informal’
knowledge spillovers. More recently, the interaction between business
and academia has evolved toward more explicit and direct forms. Studies
from diﬀerent approaches have expressed concerns about this process,
but have also highlighted some opportunities.
I have tackled the issue from a principal-agent perspective. I have
used the speciﬁc case of the provision of incentives to scientists to blend
two principal-agent approaches that, to date, have not been combined:
multi-task agency models with distorted performance measures, and
common agency models. The presence of distorted performance mea-
sures is consistent with the diﬃculties in evaluating scientiﬁce ﬀort. I
compared a case of common agency, where scientists directly respond to
diﬀerent communities, to a setting where diﬀerent teams work for dif-
ferent institutions, and the inﬂuences are through knowledge spillovers.
The main eﬀects of these interactions has been referred to as: scaling,
21alignment, free riding, information, duplication. Some of these eﬀects,
like scaling, alignment and free riding, are present in both conﬁgura-
tions. The information eﬀect I have considered emerges when diﬀerent
teams are operating, and knowledge spillovers occur between them. The
absence of duplication of eﬀort is a potential advantage of a common
agency setting. The second-best level of welfare may be greater in ei-
ther conﬁguration, according to the values of the parameters. I also
tried to relate diﬀerent values of the parameters to the features of some
industries.
4.1 Limitations of the model
The model I propose is very simpliﬁed. My characterization of the mech-
anisms of production of knowledge and economic rents from research ac-
tivities is crude. For example, there is no interaction between basic and
applied activities, since they enter the production functions additively.
Other limitations are the separability of the disutility function, and the
consideration of only formal agreements: informal-relational contracts
and reputation concerns are likely to be important, especially in the Sci-
entiﬁcC o m m u n i t y 19. It would be interesting to explore settings that
imply direct strategic interaction also among agents. Finally, it would
be valuable to explore more precise empirical predictions of the model..
4.2 Main insights
Despite the limitations, my model conveys a few interesting, and some-
what novel, insights.
1. My joint consideration of incentive issues and knowledge spillovers
provides a more comprehensive view of the relations between the nature
of knowledge and the institutional norms that aﬀect its production.
2. A major insight concerns the necessity to take into account sev-
eral incongruities between an agent’s actions and the desired outcomes.
These incongruities can diﬀer in exclusive dealing and in common agency,
and more generally depends on the kind of institutional arrangements.
3. My model also helps to distinguish between the impact of diﬀer-
ences in the objective functions and in the provided incentives. I allow
for the presence of both institutional diversity and institutional interac-
tion: institutional objectives are kept diﬀerent, but the interaction takes
place in the optimal deﬁnition of incentives and in the way scientists
respond to them. The (assumed) diﬀerence in objectives is important
to stimulate diﬀerent kinds of activities a society cares about. How-
ever, the provision of incentives to fulﬁll these objectives, when eﬀort is
19On this last point, see Baker et al (1999), and also some interesting considerations
about academic activities and ‘public trust’ in Argyres and Liebeskind (1998).
22hard to measure, may add some complications in the way institutional
diﬀerences translate into social welfare.
4. My model encompasses diﬀerent forms of interaction, more and
less formal, in the same theoretical framework and in a relatively parsi-
monious and tractable way. This is helpful for identifying, in a consistent
w a y ,t h ed r i v e r so ft h er e s u l t sa n df o rc o m p a r i n gt h ed i ﬀerent cases.
5. Finally, the model attributes an active role to the scientiﬁcc o m -
munity, and tries to substantiate generic references to a ’taste for science’
on the part of researchers.
Issues of industry-university relationship are crucial for public policy
as well as for the management of innovation, and have been treated
from several perspectives, theoretical and empirical. My framework can
oﬀer an additional, and potentially fruitful, perspective to analyze these
topics.
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286F i g u r e s
The principals 
simultaneously set the 











B) in order to 
maximize her (their)  net
wage(s).
Time (t)
Figure 1: The timing of the games
Exclusive dealing
Principal A Principal B
Agent A Agent B
Common agency
Principal A Principal B
Agent
Figure 2: A representation of the diﬀerences in strategic interaction in
the cases of exclusive dealing and common agency
29Numerical examples
Case 1
Parameter values: k =( .17;.84); φ =( .25;1.2); p =( .5; variable);
γ =( .6;.35); β =( .1;.1); δ =( .08;.08); σ =( .12;.12); η =( .12;.12)
ts=total surplus
30Case 2
Parameter values: k =( .17;.84); φ =( .22;1.4); p =( .4;.1) ;




Parameter values: k =( .2;.6); φ =( .3;1); p =( .5;.2) ; γ =( .6;.2);
β =( .13;.13); δ =( .12;.12); σ =( .15;.15); |η| variable
ts=total surplus
327A p p e n d i x
7.1 Proof of results (31) and (32)
The proofs for results (19) and (20), the exclusive-dealing case, and
for results (31) and (32), the common agency case, follow the same
reasoning. Therefore, I provide only the proof for (31) and (32).
Notice that the objective function is concave, so the ﬁrst order con-
















2αB = p1γ1 + p2γ2 − γ1φ1αA − γ2φ2αA (34)
This gives the reaction functions in (29) and (30), and, from them,
we obtain (31) and (32).
7.2 A more general case with aﬃne schemes - Mul-
tiple equilibria in common agency
In this note, I show the complications that derive from assuming aﬃne
schemes (ﬁxed salary plus piece rate, more commonly used in the liter-
ature), in the (intrinsic) common agency case.
Suppose the wage schemes take the form:
WA = τA + αAX (35)
WB = τB + αBY (36)
where τA and τB are the ﬁxed salaries. The agent’s problem is the
same as before. Consider the principals’ problem. Principal A solves:
MaxαA{E[ΠA]=E[K − (τA + αAX)]} (37)
subject to
e1 = αAφ1 + αBγ1 (38)
e2 = αAφ2 + αBγ2 (39)
E(WA + WB − C) ≥ 0 (40)
33I now consider explicitly the participation constraint. The reason
will be clear shortly.
Principal B solves:
MaxαB{E[ΠB]=E[P − (τB + αBY )]} (41)
subject to the same constraints.
The Lagrangian for principal A is therefore:
ΛA =K − (τA + αAX)+λA[WA + WB − C]= (42)
k1(αAφ1 + αBγ1)+k2(αAφ2 + αBγ2)
−{τA + αA[φ1(αAφ1 + αBγ1)+φ2(αAφ2 + αBγ2)]} (43)
+λA{αA[φ1(αAφ1 + αBγ1)+φ2(αAφ2 + αBγ2)] + τA






Principal A solves the f.o.c. with respect to αA, τA and the Lagrange
multiplier λA. The ﬁrst order condition for τA gives: λA =1 . Therefore,










As for the ﬁxed salaries, we need to solve:
τA + αAX + τB + αBY − C =0 (46)
for principal A, and
τA + αAX + τB + αBY − C =0 (47)
for principal B, with respect to τA and τB (all the other terms are
now functions of known, exogenous parameters). The two expressions
are identical and we cannot ﬁnd a unique solution. Notice that now the
strategic interaction is transferred to the ﬁxed salary. Because of these
complications, I opt, in my model, for purely linear schemes and internal
solutions. For consistency, I do the same for the exclusive dealing case.
The absence of a ﬁxed component of the salary also implies that
the principals cannot separate between creating incentives to increase
34the surplus, through the piece rate, and sharing the generated sur-
plus, through the ﬁxed component (see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)).
Now, both functions have to be performed by the piece rate in the ’pure
linear’ scheme. This may imply, for example, that the principals prefer
to leave to the agent some utility above her reservation level .
35